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LAYNE M. CAMPBELL HAND DELIVERED 
March 15, 1988 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Allen Steel Co. v. Deseret Title 
Holding Corp., et al. 
Case No. 20532 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
I am in receipt of Mr. Palmer's letter to you of March 7, 
1988. That letter states that it is submitted pursuant to Rule 
24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which permits a party 
to advise the Court by letter of (i) supplemental citations, (ii) 
a reference to the brief or argument to which the citations 
pertain, and (iii) a statement, "without argument" of the reasons 
for the supplemental citations. Mr. Palmer s submission on 
behalf of Allen Steel Company does not in our judgment comply 
with this rule, is argumentative, and in addition contains 
materials (such as selected quotations of the trial court's 
statements from the bench) that are inappropriate for submission 
under Rule 24(j). Accordingly, we suggest that Allen Steel's 
letter should not be submitted to the Court. If it is submitted, 
however, we request that this letter be submitted to the Court 
concurrently so that both sides of the issues will be presented. 
1. Allen Steel's letter implicitly argues that the trial 
court found, and that the Supreme Court should find, that the 
parties' written agreement was ambiguous as to design respon-
sibility and that the trial court construed the parties' design 
responsibilities based in part on parol. The trial court found 
that the written agreement was not an integration [Findings of 
Fact, % 11], but did not find any ambiguity in the written 
agreement itself. Rather, the trial court found that the written 
contract was supplemented with additional oral agreements not 
pertaining to design [Conclusions of Law, 1% 1 and 2]. The trial 
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court's ruling as to design responsibility was based upon "the 
language of the contract." [Conclusions of Law, \ 2]. 
2. Allen Steel's letter quotes the following statement 
made by Judge Daniels: 
1 think the Findings of Fact clearly state, 
clearly enough state at this point what 1 did 
intend to find which is that Allen Steel 
agreed to provide a design, but that ultimate 
responsibility for it would not be Allen 
Steel. 
This quotation is offered by Allen Steel as evidence that the 
trial court (expressly contrary to Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 
2) considered extrinsic evidence in determining the parties' 
design responsibility. That quotation, however, which considered 
Findings of Fact No. 13 [R. at 2895], does not indicate either 
that the trial court found the written agreement ambiguous 
concerning design responsibility or that the trial court con-
sidered any extrinsic evidence on that subject. The trial court 
expressly based its ruling on the parties' design responsibil-
ities upon "the language of the contract." [Conclusions of Law, 
1 2]. 
3. Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 71 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 46 (Ct. App. 1987) merely adopts the usual rule that if the 
trial court makes a proper threshold legal determination that a 
writing is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent 
must be considered to ascertain the meaning of the ambiguous 
provision. "Parol evidence is admissible to clarify facial 
ambiguity of a contract." Id., at 47. Craig Food does not hold 
that if the trial court finds a writing unambiguous, an appellate 
court should consider parol to sustain tEe trial court's otherwise 
improper interpretation of a written contract's language. Such a 
holding would require this Court to make factual findings that 
the trial court never addressed. 
4. Porter v. Grover, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987) is to the 
same effect: 
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial 
court proceeds to find facts respecting the 
intentions of the parties based on extrinsic 
evidence, the Court will not disturb the 
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findings. 
465. 
(Emphasis added) I<I. at 
5. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985) sets 
forth a proposition that is germane here: 
If a trial court interprets a contract as a 
matter of law, we accord its construction no 
particular weight, reviewing its actions 
under a correctness standard. 16.. at 716. 
In this regard, the trial court here concluded at paragraph 2 of 
its Conclusions of Law: 
The language in the contract effectively 
excluded any warranty for the design. 
(Emphasis added) [R. 4603] 
Thus, the "language in the contract" must be reviewed by this 
Court to determine whether the trial court's construction was 
appropriate, under a correctness standard. 
As required by the rule, we have enclosed the original and 
nine copies of this letter. Thank you. 
BAM:rj 
enclosures 
cc: Joseph J. Palmer, Esq. 
Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. 
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